Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

by Joel Slemrod

Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass

Written in English
Published: Pages: 43 Downloads: 248
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Subjects:

  • Tax havens -- Mathematical models,
  • Taxation -- Mathematical models,
  • Globalization

Edition Notes

Other titlesTax competition and parasitic tax havens.
StatementJoel Slemrod, John D. Wilson.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- no. 12225., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 12225.
ContributionsWilson, John D., National Bureau of Economic Research.
The Physical Object
Pagination43 p. :
Number of Pages43
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17630389M
OCLC/WorldCa69117727

Tax competition, a form of regulatory competition, exists when governments use reductions in fiscal burdens to encourage the inflow of productive resources or to discourage the exodus of those , this means a governmental strategy of attracting foreign direct investment, foreign indirect investment (financial investment), and high value human resources by minimizing the overall. She is known for her books and her work on tax havens, tax competition, charities, international and environmental taxation. Brigitte Alepin advised governments and international organizations, she served as an expert witness on various committees of the House of Commons and the Senate of Canada and she is a member the National Assembly of France. Tax haven countries offer foreign investors low tax rates and other tax features designed to attract investment and thereby stimulate economic activity. Major tax havens have less than 1 percent of. one hand, J.C. Sharman concluded in his book on tax havens that the OECD effort was unsuccessful: "[b]y the small [S]tate tax havens had prevailed, and the campaign to regulate international tax competition had failed."4 On the other hand, Vaughn James argued as early as

The average top tax rate in the developed world has dropped from more than 67% in to barely 40% today. The same thing is happening to corporate tax rates. Back in , corporate tax rates averaged nearly 50%. Today, led by Ireland’s % corporate tax, the average corporate rate in the industrialized world is less than 27%.   Havens like Luxembourg turn ‘tax competition’ into a global race to the bottom This article is more than 5 years old An overhaul of the Grand Duchy’s corporate tax law and administration is. "Why do Most Countries Set High Tax Rates on Capital?" (with Nicolas Marceau and Steeve Mongrain), Journal of International Econom (). "Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens" (with Joel Slemrod), Journal of Public Econom (). Joel Slemrod studies and writes about tax policy. In he was senior staff economist at the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, and has been a consultant to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Canadian Department of Finance, the New Zealand Department of Treasury, the South African Ministry of Finance, the World Bank, the OECD, and several corporations.

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens by Joel Slemrod Download PDF EPUB FB2

This paper develops a model of tax competition in the presence of parasitic tax havens that explains and justi!es existing initiatives to limit haven activities.

In the model, tax havens lead to a wasteful expenditure of resources, both by!rms in their participation in havens and by governments in their attempts to enforce their tax codes. This paper develops a model of tax competition in the presence of parasitic Tax competition with parasitic tax havens book havens that explains and justifies existing initiatives to limit haven activities.

In the model, tax havens lead to a wasteful expenditure of resources, both by firms in their participation in havens and by governments in their attempts to enforce their tax by: Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens Joel Slemrod, John D.

Wilson. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in May NBER Program(s):Public Economics. We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens.

Abstract. We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens.

We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven by: This paper develops a model of tax competition in the presence of parasitic tax havens that explains and justifies existing initiatives to limit haven activities.

As should be expected, tax havens lead to the wasteful expenditure of resources, both by firms in their participation in havens and by governments in their attempts to enforce their tax.

We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries. The havens use real resources to help companies camouflage their home-country tax avoidance, and countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenues to the havens.

We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit. Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens. Joel Slemrod and John Wilson. NoNBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Abstract: We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries. The havens use real resources to help companies camouflage their home-country tax.

Tax havens We present a model of tax competition for real investment and profits and show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenue of countries. In the first part of the paper, we argue that tax competition for profits is likely to be imperfect in the sense that the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate does.

Journal of Public Economics,vol. 93, issueAbstract: We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens.

We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would. Get this from a library. Tax competition with parasitic tax havens. [Joel Slemrod; John D Wilson; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Downloadable (with restrictions). We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens.

"Tax competition with parasitic tax havens." Journal of Public Economics, 93(): We develop a taxcompetition framework in which some jurisdictions, called taxhavens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens.

“The OECD suffered a defeat when the central goal of the initiative—the prevention of tax havens from ‘poaching’ geographically mobile investment by means of tax and regulatory concessions—was abandoned” (11).

Sharman's book provides a good overview of these events and a. Parasitic tax havens Slemrod and Wilson () start with the standard tax competition model, as described above, where a large, but fixed number of identical countries compete for capital through reductions in capital tax rates.

But they add “parasitic” tax havens to the model; that is, tax ha. Tax havens also offer tax cuts and tax loopholes (and secrecy) for multinationals or wealthy individuals who locate themselves or activities there.

These strategies are usually pursued in the name of a euphemism like “competitiveness” or “open for business”, which may sound appealing but in fact is a woolly-headed concept that is the. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries.

The havens use real resources to help companies camouflage their home-country tax avoidance, and countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenues to the. ‘Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens’.

NBER Working Paper No. [Google Scholar]). 6 Belgium initiated a system of partial deductions in and has had a general deduction since ; the Netherlands had introduced a credit prior even to the US.

Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion Jane G. Gravelle Senior Specialist in Economic Policy Janu Congressional Research Service R Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion Congressional Research Service Summary.

While there is a view that tax competition and tax avoidance are laws of nature and that the corporate tax is bound to disappear in a globalized world, the reality is different.7 Nothing 5 $ trillion is located in just 9 havens (Bermuda, the Caymans, Ireland, Jersey, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Puerto Rico, Singapore, and Switzerland).

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens: Journal of Public Economics: 93 () Joel Slemrod, John D. Wilson 6 What problems and opportunities are created by tax havens. Oxford Review of Economic Policy: 24 (4) Dhammika Dharmapala, James Hines: 7 In praise of tax havens: International tax planning.

We are an independent international network launched in We conduct high-level research, analysis and advocacy on international tax; on the international aspects of financial regulation; on the role of tax in society; and on the impacts of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax ‘competition’ and tax havens.

International tax competition has come to the forefront of global economic policy debate at the outset of the 21st Century. The importance of taxation regimes as an essential factor in driving economic growth, investment inflows and national development has increasingly been recognised.

Tax havens are low-tax jurisdictions that offer businesses and individuals opportunities for tax avoidance. The 45 major tax haven countries in the world. Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens.

Journal of Public Economics, 93(11), – CrossRef Google Scholar. Spencer, D. International Tax Cooperation: Centrifugal vs. Centripetal Forces: Part 1. Journal of International Taxation, 21(5), 46– Buy this book on publisher's site; Reprints and Permissions; Personalised. The OECD's Harmful Tax Competition of departed in both tone and substance from almost anything the organization had published before.

The roots of the associated project lie mainly in EU concerns that certain forms of intra-union competition were eroding both the corporate and personal income tax bases of member states. From the Cayman Islands and the Isle of Man to the Principality of Liechtenstein and the state of Delaware, tax havens offer lower tax rates, less stringent regulations and enforcement, and promises of strict secrecy to individuals and corporations alike.

In recent years government regulators, hoping to remedy economic crisis by diverting capital from hidden channels back into taxable view 4/5(2). Many well-regulated countries offer tax incentives for attracting outside investment but are not classified as tax havens.

This leads to the second, and most important, attribute of a tax haven. The most original part of Zucman's book is the second, in which he offers the most comprehensive evaluation to date of the scope of the tax-haven problem. Zucman came up with a brilliant new way of calculating the wealth hidden in tax havens by comparing reported financial assets and liabilities in the world's financial centers.

Another massive leak of information from a tax haven law firm – dubbed the Paradise Papers – has shone a spotlight on the questionable ways in which wealthy individuals and big companies.

Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, this book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in : Peter Dietsch.Tax competition is also playing a role in the global flat-tax revolution.

25 years ago, Hong Kong was the only recognizable flat-tax jurisdiction. Today, there are dozens of flat-tax jurisdictions, including Russia, Slovakia, Iceland, and Estonia.James R. Hines Jr.

(born 9 July ) is an American economist and a founder of academic research into corporate-focused tax havens, and the effect of U.S. corporate tax policy on the behaviors of U.S. papers were some of the first to analyse profit shifting, and to establish quantitative features of tax showed that being a tax haven could be a prosperous.